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BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Lamar Anderson, hereinafter referred to as the
husband, and Florence J. Anderson Pluckard, former
wife of Lamar Anderson, hereinafter referred to as the
wife, were married, one to the other, at Seattle, State
of Washington, on July 16, 1936. From this union there
were begotten two sons, Craig and Brent, and two
daughters, Diane and Michele. The youngest child is
now of the approximate age of 10 years, and the eldest
child of the approximate age of 17 years. Unhappy differences having arisen between the husband and wife,
their marriage contract was dissolved by decree of
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divorce issuing on the 26th day of September, 1949, from
the Third Judicial District Court of the State of Utah.
(Tr. 15)
On the lOth day of September, 1949, in contemplation of the divorce proceedings, the husband and wife
entered into a stipulation and agreement (Tr. 4) dividing
between them their joint properties accumulated as a
result of their joint efforts as husband and wife. (Tr. 4)
The portion of that distribution with which we are here
in this action concerned reads as follows :
"It is further agreed that the one-half of the
net sales price of this property hereby and herewith given to the defendant, LaMar Anderson,
shall be placed in trust with a trust company located in Phoenix, Arizona, the name of which to be
mutually agreed upon and selected by the parties
hereto, and that said one-half (lh) of net sales
price, less the costs of disbursements and handling
of the same to be paid by said trust company, is to
be paid directly to the said Florence Anderson at
the rate of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00)
per month for the purpose of providing support
money for the minor children of the parties. That
said payments of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars
($250.00) shall be made until the said one-half of
said net sales price has been paid to the plaintiff
herein. Wh en said one-half of said net sales price
of said property has been fully paid to the plaintiff as herein provided, the defendant, LaMar
Anderson, shall then commence to pay to the
plaintiff, Florence Anderson, the sutn of Two
Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per month fot· the care,
support and maintenance of the minor children
herein." (Tr. 8) (Emphasis added)
1

The real property above referred to was situated in

2
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Phoenix, Arizona, and consisted of motel rental units ;
at all times hereinafter mentioned and during all of the
proceedings in the court below, said property remained
unsold and the wife had possession thereof and received
the income, if any there was, therefrom.
The stipulation and agreement of the parties hereinabove referred to was incorporated into and became a
part of the decreement of divorce, wherein it was ordered:
"And it is further ordered that the provisions
of said stipulation and each and every one of
them, be and the same hereby are incorporated
into this decree by this reference and made a part
hereof and that each of said parties receive the
respective shares agreed upon therein and that
each perform the respective obligations imposed
upon each therein and that the support of the
minor children of the parties be paid as provided
therein." (Tr. 16) (Emphasis added)
On or about the 11th day of August, 1952, the then
counsel for the wife filed in the Third Judici_al District
Court a petition for order to show cause (Tr. 17) in
which the wife alleged :
"That pursuant to said decree plaintiff was
awarded $200.00 per month for the care, support
and maintenance of the minor children of the
parties. That since the entering of said decree,
and up to and including the lOth day of August,
1952, there was due and owing to plaintiff, under
the said decree, for the support, care and maintenance of the minor children of the parties, the
sum of $7,000.00." (Tr. 17)
Order to show cause issued. (Tr. 19) The husband
cross-petitioned (Tr. 21) and alleged:

3
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"Defendant alleges that under the Decree
payments for support are not due to the plaintiff
at this time since the Decree provides that a certain property was to be sold by either of the
parties and one half of the net proceeds of the
sale applied to the support of the children at the
rate of $250.00 per month, and that such property
has not been sold." (Tr. 21)
The cause was argued before the court on the 22nd
day of August, 1952 (Tr. 23), and on the 26th day of
August, 1952, the court entered its Findings in part as
follows:
"That under the terms of the divorce decree
heretofore entered in the above entitled action the
defenda;nt was ordered to pay to plaintiff for the
support and maintenance of the four minor children of the parties the sum of $200.00 per month,
i.e., $50.00 for each minor child; that there has accrued as such support money up to and including
August 10, 1952, the sum of $7 ,000.00, of which
amount the defendant has paid $2,515.59 ; that
there is now due and owing to plaintiff by defendant back support money in the sum of $4,--184.41."
(Tr. 24) (Emphasis added)
On the date last above mentioned the court then made
its order and decreed as follows:
"1. That plaintiff be and she is hereby
awarded judgment against defendant for back
support money in the sum of $4,484.41, for $125.00
attorneys fees and costs.
"2. That the property described in Paragraph 3, subsection (e) of the Stipulation and
Agreement specifically incorporated in the divorce
decree be sold as soon as possible. (Emphasis
added)
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"3. That defendant is hereby found in contempt of court and sentenced to serve 30 days in
the County Jail for his wilfull failure to comply
with the decree of the court; that said sentence is
hereby suspended upon defendant's compliance
with the following conditions: That defendant pay
to plaintiff the sum of $300.00 per month commencing on the 1st day of September, 1952, and
payable on the 1st day of each and every month
thereafter until the further order of the court;
said payments to be made at the office of the
Clerk of Salt Lake County and to be allocated as
follows: $200.00 per month as current support
money and $100.00 per month to apply on the back
support money." (Tr. 26 and 27)
Thereafter, upon affidavit of the wife, the court,
Honorable Clarence E. Baker presiding, did on the lOth
day of February, 1953, order the arrest of the husband
for the wilful failure to comply with the order of the
court, dated the 26th day of August, 1952. (Tr. 30)
On May 1, 1953, the husband petitioned the Third
Judicial District Court to vacate its order (Tr. 31) The
matter was heard by the court on the 12th day of September, 1953, and the matter was argued to the court
and submitted on the said 12th day of September, 1953,
and the court on the 5th day of February, 1954, ordered
the petition dismissed. (Tr. 37, 84, 86) Counsel for the
husband filed notice of appeal (Tr. 87) and designation of
record on appeal (Tr. 88) in said cause, Florence J.
Anderson, Plaintiff-Respondent, vs. Lamar Anderson,
Defendant-Appellant, 3 Utah 2d 277, 282 P. 2d, 845.
In that action this Honorable Court disn1issed the
husband's appeal on the ground and for the reason that
5
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the appeal was not taken in time and that failure to do
so was jurisdictional and noticeable by the court sua
sponte.
The husband seeks here a writ of prohibition arresting the execution of the order of the Third District Court.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
PROHIBITION IS THE ONLY LEGAL RECOURSE REMAINING TO PLAINTIFF TO ASSURE HIM SUBSTANTIAL
JUSTI·CE IN THE COURTS OF UTAH TO PREVENT A
PALPABLE AND IRREMEDIABLE INJUSTICE.

POINT II.
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FINDING THE PLAINTIFF IN ARREARS IN PAYMENT UNDER THE TERMS
OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE AND FURTHER ERRED IN
SENTENCING THE PLAINTIFF TO AN IMPRISONMENT
FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PROHIBITION IS THE ONLY LEGAL RECOURSE REMAINING TO PLAINTIFF TO ASSURE HIM SUBSTANTIAL
JUSTI·CE IN THE COURTS OF UTAH TO PREVENT A
PALPABLE AND IRREMEDIABLE INJUSTICE.

Plaintiff is confronted with incarceration in the gaol
for contempt of court, and, we think, for a contempt
based upon a wrongful and arbitrary exercise of its
jurisdiction by the defendant Court. It has been recently
held that:
"Adjudication of 'contempt of court' may be
predicated only on contumacious disregard of
some writ, precept, decree, order or command
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emanating from court in proper exercise of its
jurisdiction."

In re Roberts, 30 A. 2d 900, 902, 133 N. J. Eq. 122.
Such a rule is so sound that it needs no further
support.
By its order the court has placed plaintiff in a
position where he will be irreparably injured, and it is
now clear that he has no adequate remedy to prevent
such injury and has had none since the decision from
this court in Anderson v. Anderson, supra. In such case
this court has said that it may use the writ in the exercise of its sound discretion to prevent irreparable injury.
11/layers v. Bronson, 100 Utah 279, 114 P. 2d 213, 136
A.L.R. 698; Atwood v. Cox, 88 Utah 437, 55 P. 2d 377;
Olsen v. District Court, 106 Utah 220, 147 P. 2d 471.
In Mayers v. Bronson, supra, the writ issued because
the plaintiff, in order to pursue his remedy by appeal,
would either have had to forego a claim for immunity or
refuse and risk a sentence for contempt. In the case at
bar your plaintiff has no further remedy by appeal and
has already been sentenced for the contempt. Therefore
he is more deserving of this extraordinary writ than
was the petitioner, Mayers. The original purpose of the
writ was to secure the sovereign rights and preserve the
public quiet; * * * it has been said, to prevent some
great outrage upon the settled principles of law and procedure, in cases where wrong, damage, and injustice are
likely to follow from such action. See 42 Am. J ur.,
Prohibition, page 141, and cases there cited.
In the case of People ex rel Childs, v. Extraordinary
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Trial Term of Supreme Court, 228 N.Y. 463, 468, 127
N.E. 486-7, tlv~ court said:
"The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary
remedy for unusual cases, resorted to, not to
correct errors, but in aid of substantial justice.

•**"
For plaintiff we would contend that incarceration in
the gaol for the failure to perform what he had not by
the original decree of divorce been ordered to perform
would most certainly do unto him a substantial injustice.
POINT II.
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FINDING THE PLAINTIFF IN ARREARS IN PAYMENT UNDER THE TERMS
OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE AND FURTHER ERRED IN
SENTENCING THE PLAINTIFF TO AN IMPRISONMENT
FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT.

The action commenced in the court below was an
order to show cause, based upon a divorce decree, in
which plaintiff incorrectly alleged that the said decree
provided for the payment of $200.00 per month support
monies co1'nm.encing with the entry of said decree. Had
the action in the court below been a petition to modify
the decree, then the court, without altering the terms of
the original decree which was based upon the facts existent at the time said decree was made, would have been
in a position to adjudicate the equities and to give to
the wife in that cause any proper relief for which she
could show entitlement. It was error for the court below
to alter the terms of the original decree by proceeding
under an order to show cause. Cody v. Cody, 47 Utah
456, 154 P. 952. So long as an original decree ~tands, the
8
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parties are bound by the terms thereof; this court so
held a husband, ( Osmus v. Osmus, 114 Utah 216, 198 P.
2d 233) and a wife must also be so held- at least until
she pleads and proves a change in circumstances such
as to require, in fairness and equity, a change in the
terms of the decree. Osmus v. Osmus, supra, and cases
there cited.
vVe do not here contend that a decree of divorce in
which a property settlement agreement has been incorporated cannot be modified. Our law provides for subsequent changes and new orders, 30-3-5, UCA 1953; but
subsequent changes cannot be made without limitation
and a court cannot change or modify a judgment at will.
In the instant case, the decree of divorce provides,
in part:
"4. That the plaintiff, Florence J. Anderson,
be not awarded any alimony and that henceforth
she not be entitled to any; the said plaintiff, having in her stipulation with the defendant, elected
to receive a cash award as alimony and as and for
complete settlement of the same as provided in
said stipulation. * * *
"6. And it is further ordered that the provisions of said stipulation and each and every one
of them, be and the same hereby are incorporated
into this decree by this reference and made a part
hereof and that each of said parties receive the
respective shares agreed upon therein and that
each perform the respective obligations imposed
upon each therein and that the support of the
minor children of the parties be paid as provided
therein." (Emphasis added)
The stipulation and agreement, the terms of which
9
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the court ordered the parties to comply with, provides:
"5. It is further agreed between the parties,
subject to the approval of the Court, that the property described in subparagraph (c) of paragraph
3 of this stipulation shall be sold, and that either
of the parties may list the same for sale after October 1, 1949, and that the plaintiff, Florence
Anderson, may have the income from said property until the same has been sold.
"It is agreed between the parties hereto that
the one-half (:lj2 ) of the net sales price of this
property shall be the sole and separate property
and money of the plaintiff, and that she receive
the same in full payment and satisfaction of any
and all present or future claim of alimony from
the defendant, LaMar Anderson, and that she
waives any and further claim to any right to
alimony.
"It is further agreed that the one-half of the
net sales price of this property hereby and herewith given to the defendant, LaMar Anderson,
shall be placed in trust with a trust company
located in Phoenix, Arizona, the name of which
to be mutually agreed upon and selected by the
parties hereto, and that said one-half ( ¥2) of net
sales price, less the costs of disbursements and
handling of the same to be paid by said trust company, is to be paid directly to the said Florence
Anderson at the rate of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) per month for the purpose of providing support money for the minor children of
the parties. That said payments of Two Hundred
Dollars ($250.00) shall be made until the said
one-half of said net sales prices has been paid
to the plaintiff herein. When said one-half of
said net sales price of said property has been
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fully paid to the plaintiff as herein provided, the
defendant, LaMar Anderson, shall then commence
to pay to the plaintiff, Florence Anderson, the sum
of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per month for
the care, support and maintenance of the minor
children herein."
Notwithstanding the provisions of the decree and
of the stipulation and agreement as above set out, the
court below found said LaMar Anderson delinquent in
the payment of support monies in the amount of "$200.00
per month i.e. $50.00 for each minor child" from the date
of entry of the divorce decree for an accrued total sum of
$7 ,000.00. Set off was allowed in the amount of $2,515.59,
which represented funds donated by plaintiff in addition
to what the decree and agreement provided for. J udgment was entered in the sum of $4,484.41 and plaintiff
was held to be in contempt of court, and sentenced to gaol.
Separation~ agreements are not contrary to public
policy and they are generally enforced by the courts of
this country and of England (see 17 Am. J ur., Divorce
and Separation, Sec. 722, et seq.) ; they have been sustained by this court. Johnson v. Johnson, 107 Utah 147,
152 P. 2c1 426; Barraclough v. Barraclough, 100 Utah 196,
111 P. 2d 792; Jones v. Jones, 104 Utah 275, 139 P. 2d
222. Our court said, in the case of Hall v. Hall, 111 Utah
263, 177 P. 2d 731, at 733:
"It is true that we have held that a stipulation for an alimony settlement is only a recommendation to the court-Jones v. Jones, 104 Utah
275, 139 P. 2d 222- but we did not mean by that
11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that it was to be given no weight at all. Absent
any proof to the contrary the lower court should
assume that the parties best know their own financial standing and capabilities, and accept their
stipulations for its face value, unless the record
before the court obviously indicates that to accept
the stipulation would not accomplish equity. To
ignore the wishes of the partie-s without grounds
for doing so clearly is an arbitrary and capricious
act."
The agreement between the parties should be enforced and if there is to be subsequent change or a new
order made, it must be upon proper procedure and only
after a showing by the moving party of a change in conditions since the entry of the decree. Gardner v. Gardner,
111 Utah 286, 177 P. 2d 743. In the case of Openshaw v.
Openshaw, 105 Utah 574, 144 P. 2d 528, this court held
that the right of a trial court to modify an alimony or
support money award did not extend to installments that
had accrued; it follows, does it not, that where, as here,
under the terms of the decree, nothing had become due
or had accrued, it would not be within the province of the
court to enter judgment for a sum not owing thereunder.
In the cause at bar, we do not come before this
court on the issue of the responsibility of a father to
support his children. Our cause would have little merit
if such were our contention. We readily concede that the
obligation does exist and that it is the prerogative, and
in fact the obligation, of the courts of this state to enforce such an obligation when they are properly called
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upon so to do. If conditions have so changed in the lives
of the parties to the separation agreement since their
voluntary entry therein, appropriate adjudication should
be had to make adjustment therefor. Mrs. Pluckard has
a remedy in the courts, and that remedy is to seek a
modification of the terms of the divorce decree by proper
proceedings through which she may obtain her just entitlement. The plaintiff here, her former husband, stands
in jeopardy of imprisonment, and we submit he there
stands without a showing against him of contempt such
as would amount to a contumacious disregard of the
divorce decree, or in fact, any disregard to the terms
thereof whatever.
May we take the liberty of further pointing out to
the Court that under terms of the Stipulation and Agreement between the parties hereto and the decree of divorce,
all Mrs. Pluckard need have done to commence her entitlement to payments of support money in the sum of
$200.00 per month by this plaintiff was to sell the property in Phoenix, Arizona and to have exhausted onehalf of the net proceeds therefrom at the rate of $250.00
per month. Mrs. Pluckard's entitlement to payments in
the amount of $200.00 from Mr. Anderson would have
immediately accrued upon the exhaustion of the funds
r·eceived from the sale, regardless of what amount of
.r10neys the property might have been sold for.
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CONCLUSION
The writ should be made permanent ; the plaintiff
here, LaMar Anderson, should not be incarcerated in the
County Gaol upon a finding of a contempt of which he
was clearly innocent and which we respectfully contend
came from a wrongful and arbitrary exercise of jurisdiction.
Respectfully submitted,
FRED L. FINLINSON
Attorney for Plaintiff
Salt Lake City, Utah
312 Kearns Building
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